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Digital technology offers new options for product-developing firms. However, to reap the benefits of digital
technology, firms need to handle the tensions between these options and the institutionalized practices established
over long periods of incremental innovation. We report on a twenty-month intensive case study of a global
automaker’s efforts to innovate instrument clusters and explore the influencing role of established innovation
practices. We develop a conceptual model for understanding how digital technology shapes, and is conditioned by,
the dominant design of a product class. Our research contributes to the emerging literature of digital innovation and
offers lessons learned for established firms dealing with the contradictory logics of digitized products.
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INTRODUCTION
The integration of software in physical products is radically challenging the innovation processes of established firms
(Lenfle and Midler 2009). On one hand, it multiplies the space of digital options available for augmenting existing
offers and launching radically new ones (Jonsson et al. 2008; Yoo et al. 2010). On the other hand, seizing emergent
digital options is difficult because established product innovation practices may not involve the necessary IT
capabilities or organizational agility (Henfridsson et al. 2009; Sambamurthy et al. 2003).
In the innovation literature, significant attention has been paid to the tension between options provided by new
technology and institutionalized practices established over long periods of incremental innovation (Anderson and
Tushman 1990; Hargadon and Douglas 2001). In particular, the notion of dominant design has been coined to
capture how innovation practices typically congeal over time as a template for product innovation within an industry
(Murmann and Frenken 2006; Suarez 2004; Teece 1986). Dominant designs help firms organizing their innovation
processes so that they capitalize on their intellectual, relational, and technical resources. Over time, this leads to a
reciprocal relationship between the product design and the cross-organizational processes involved in carrying out
product innovation. Baldwin and Clark (2000) refer to this relationship as the fundamental isomorphism between task
structure and design structure.
As a response to recent calls for more IS research on the digitization of physical artifacts and infrastructures (Tilson
et al. 2010; Yoo et al. 2010), we elaborate this relationship between the organization and product in the context of
digital innovation. We refer to digital innovation as “the carrying out of new combinations of digital and physical
components to produce novel products” (Yoo et al. 2010, p. 725). Viewing innovation as recombination (Arthur 2009;
Schumpeter 1934) necessarily involves a focus on both the technology that is combined into a new product and the
organizational configurations that allow such combination. While tight linkages between these entities are important
to leverage a dominant design and existing capabilities, numerous studies have documented how such coupling
lowers a firm’s capability to respond to new technology (Anderson and Tushman 1990; Baldwin and Clark 2000;
Eisenhardt et al. 2010; Murmann and Frenken 2006). Therefore, it can be suggested that integrating digital
components into a tangible product represents a similar challenge for established firms (Yoo et al. 2010). While
existing innovation processes embed an organizing logic fine-tuned for tangible artifacts, digital components
introduce an alien innovation logic (Svahn et al. 2009) that requires new architectural knowledge (Andersson et al.
2008; Henderson and Clark 1990). As a result, a pressing issue is how to handle upcoming tensions and
contradictions between established product innovation practices and new digital options.
The research question addressed in this paper is: How can we understand the role of dominant design in the digital
innovation of product-developing firms? We investigated this research question by conducting a twenty-month
intensive case study (Gerring 2007) of a global automaker’s use of a new software platform for in-car instrument
cluster design. Following a temporal bracketing strategy (Langley 1999), we generated a conceptual model for
understanding the role of dominant design in the digital innovation of product-developing firms. The model and its
application to the case findings serve as the basis for a set of implications for the emerging literature dedicated to
the investigation of the organization of innovation in the digital age (Boland et al. 2007; Eaton et al. 2011; Lee and
Berente 2012; Selander et al. 2010; Tilson et al. 2010; Yoo 2010; Yoo et al. 2010).

CONTRIBUTION
This paper targets IS researchers and practitioners with an interest in new forms of innovation practices emerging in the
wake of the digitalization of products. It offers a three-folded contribution to this audience.
First, it elaborates the notion of dominant design in the information systems context by developing a new conceptual model
of its role in the digital innovation practices of product-developing firms.
Second, it outlines three episodes of an automaker’s adoption of a new software platform for instrument cluster design, and
describes how the new digital technology gave birth to tensions as it challenged established cross-organizational processes
and product designs.
Finally, it suggests that the promises of digital technology cannot be cultivated in the established firm without identifying
ways to thrive with tensions and foster a transformational leadership that can handle the contradictory logics of digitized
products.
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The ongoing digitization of tangible artifacts is massive. Cameras, cars, and phones are all examples of artifacts
undergoing radical transformation as they embed increasingly powerful microprocessors, inexpensive memory,
communication bandwidth, efficient power management (Yoo et al. 2010) and become increasingly interlinked with
digital infrastructures (Tilson et al. 2010). As a result, such artifacts take on new digital properties that enhance their
basic functionality and capabilities (Yoo 2010). Consequently, the product design, i.e., “a complete description of the
structural elements of a particular artifact” (Baldwin and Clark 2000, p. 42), not only specifies the tangible
components of the product, but also the digital components augmenting its functionality.
As Yoo et al. (2010) suggest, the injection of digital technology into tangible products motivates IS researchers to
closely examine established assumptions in the innovation literature, where digital technology, with a few exceptions
(Benner 2010; Lee and Berente 2012; Lyytinen and Rose 2003; Tripsas 2009; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000), is placed
backstage. In what follows, we outline the conceptual basis for making such an examination of the classic
relationship between the product design and organization design (cf. Baldwin and Clark 2000; Henderson and Clark
1990; Sosa et al. 2004). Our point-of-departure is that the digitization of tangible artifacts challenges, and is
challenged by, dominant designs, leading to tensions that serve as resources and restrictions in a process of
organizational becoming (Benson 1977; Orlikowski 2000).

Toward a conceptual model
The significance of dominant design, as a notion that captures how a single architecture achieves dominance in a
product class, is widely acknowledged in the product innovation literature (Anderson and Tushman 1990; Murmann
and Frenken 2006; Suarez 2004; Teece 1986; Tushman and Anderson 1986). Dominant designs are the result of
long periods of incremental change through which a particular product hierarchy of core components, form of
economies of scale, and temporality have been established. Dominant designs, therefore, influence entire industries,
making change initiatives on a firm-level difficult to accomplish. This influence flows from the fact that the
organization of the set of tasks by which a product is designed is intimately related to the components of the product
itself (Baldwin and Clark 2000; Henderson and Clark 1990; Sosa et al. 2004). To reduce complexity, it is simply
more effective to organize the product development around the basic components, or subsystems, of the product
(Parnas 1972; Simon 1962). At an automaker, for instance, the development of major car subsystems, such as the
engine, transmission, and braking system, is accomplished through specific organizational units. In turn, such
organizational units are subdivided into different teams, often cross-organizational teams, responsible for specific
components on a lower level. This includes the creation of stable and reliable relations with surrounding actors such
as vendors, suppliers, and customers. Such functional decomposition accomplishes the information-hiding and
separation of concerns necessary for managing complexity (Garud and Karnøe 2003; Schilling 2000). Thus,
dominant designs typically also impose tight linkages between established cross-organizational processes and the
standard expression of the product design (Anderson and Tushman 1990; Tushman and Anderson 1986). Over
time, the linkages between the organization design and the product design embed the architectural knowledge of the
product (cf. Henderson and Clark 1990). In this regard, the product design not only represents the technical blueprint
of the innovation but also defines its adaptability to changing circumstances and markets.
Figure 1 depicts our conceptualization of the role of dominant design in the digital innovation of product-developing
firms. Digitization refers to the encoding of analog information into digital format (Tilson et al. 2010; Yoo 2010). As
products embed digital capabilities such as reproducibility and programmability (Benkler 2006; Zittrain 2006), agility
and frequent updates of functionality are facilitated in product innovation (Svahn and Henfridsson 2012; Yoo et al.
2010). In this regard, the digitization of products influences both cross-organizational processes and the product
design. We refer to cross-organizational processes as the collaborative work practices and structures required
realizing an innovation and its product design. These structures are typically institutionalized over long periods of
time and, as previously discussed, often mirrored in the actual product design. A product design serves a blueprint,
specifications, and other descriptive elements of a specific component or complete artifact (Baldwin and Clark 2000).
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Cross-organizational processes
The collaborative work practices and
structures required to realizing an
innovation and its product design

Dominant design
The reciprocal relationship between
cross-organizational processes and
product design, manifesting the
architectural knowledge of the product.

Digitization
The encoding of analog information into
digital format. Digitization makes
products reprogrammable and facilitates
the reproducibility of their functionality.

Product design
The complete description of a specific
innovation. The product design serves as
a blueprint for production and determines
the product’s functionality.

Figure 1: Conceptual model.
The notion of dominant design not only underlines the reciprocal relationship between the cross-organizational
processes and product design but also the inherent difficulty to change either one of them. For established firms,
i.e., firms with a long-term competitive and leading position in a particular product market, shifting to digital
technology has proven difficult (Benner 2010; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). As the literature documents (Eisenhardt
and Tabrizi 1995; Tushman and Anderson 1986), established firms face numerous challenges when adapting to
technological change. Popularized as “the innovator’s dilemma” (Christensen 1997), these challenges stem from
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), management cognitions (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000), myopic
learning (Levinthal and March 1993), path dependency (Arthur 1989; David 1985), routines and capability (LeonardBarton 1995), strong identity (Tripsas 2009), and institutional pressure from both external and internal constituents
(Benner 2010; Dougherty and Heller 1994).
As digital components populate a tangible product, it can be suggested, therefore, that established linkages between
organizational processes and the product design are put under pressure. Essentially, digital technology exhibits at
least two capabilities likely to generate tensions between these entities. First, digitized products are
reprogrammable; that is, they can continuously be updated and changed throughout the product lifecycle. As Yoo et
al. (2010) write, a digitized artifact enables “separation of the semiotic functional logic of the device from the physical
embodiment that executes it.” Essentially, the programmability of digital artifacts makes them perform new functions
after their production (Zittrain 2006). This product capability breaks significantly with assumptions held in traditional
product innovation, in which much emphasis is put on early capture of requirements for specifying the functionality of
the product (see, e.g., Baldwin and Clark 2000). This is done to facilitate a detailed design necessary to enable
successful production. Second, digitized products are characterized by reproducibility. Economists of information,
such as Shapiro and Varian (1999), have noted that anything that is digitized can be reproduced without virtually any
marginal cost (cf. Benkler 2006). In contrast, significant investment in production resources is necessary for
producing tangible products to achieve economies of scale. Since digital products involve both digital and physical
components, both logics coexist in the innovation of products in the digital age. However, the differences between
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product innovation and digital innovation cover all aspects of dominant design: organization (organizing logic),
involved stakeholders (market dynamics), and product (architectural design) (Svahn and Henfridsson 2012).
Given that little, if any, research has been conducted into the conditions of digital innovation in product-developing
firms and the influencing role of dominant design on these conditions, we propose the theoretical perspective
outlined above. In what follows, we apply this perspective for analyzing GlobalCarCorp’s attempts to handle
upcoming tensions and contradictions between established product innovation practices (i.e., dominant designs) and
new digital options.

METHODOLOGY
Research Setting
In order to increase our understanding of the influencing role of dominant design in the digital innovation of productdeveloping firms, we conducted a twenty-month intensive case study (Gerring 2007) at one of the world’s largest
automakers, GlobalCarCorp. We specifically studied an instrument cluster design group of one of GlobalCarCorp’s
subsidiaries, CarCorp, and how they innovated with new digital components for instrument cluster design. CarCorp’s
development of a new platform, SoftClusterPlatform, for standardizing cluster design practices and leveraging digital
and reconfigurable displays (see Figure 2) made the design group a central node in GlobalCarCorp’s worldwide
operations in the area.

Figure 2: Instrument cluster with reconfigurable digital display.
In studying the instrument cluster design group and their practices, we focused on three categories of stakeholders:
human–machine interaction (HMI) engineers, design engineers, and software engineers. These stakeholders
represent people who were directly involved in GlobalCarCorp’s cluster design.
First, HMI engineers consisted mainly of people with expertise in ergonomics and interaction design. Their focus
ranged from the complete car and its physical interaction features (e.g., door handles, physical buttons, and car
seats) to the user interface and digitally-mediated interaction design of the instrument cluster. The second category,
which we refer to as design engineers, included industrial designers, marketers, and product managers for specific
functional units (e.g., radio or navigation). While industrial designers worked with brand communication through
design, marketers kept track on market trends and how to differentiate the CarCorp brand across the globe. Product
managers were responsible for specific subsystems of the car and how to leverage that “product” in different
markets through price strategies and the development of new features. Lastly, software engineers, as a relatively
new category of engineers, dealt with software-related requirements, tools development and selection,
programming, platform architectures, and software strategy development.

Research Design
The selection of an automaker as the empirical setting of our case study research reflects a case selection strategy
sometimes referred to as extreme (Gerring 2007; Yin 2009). A case like this “corresponds to a case that is
considered to be prototypical or paradigmatic of some phenomena of interest” (Gerring 2007, p. 101). In view of the
recent digitization and the long history of the automotive industry, automakers can be extra sensitive to tensions
between institutionalized processes and new technology. They operate in an industry characterized by a long period
of incremental innovation, where seminal writers already in 1978 observed “roadblocks to innovation” due to the
established dominant design that characterize the car (Abernathy 1978). As for the specific choice of GlobalCarCorp
as the automaker for our study, we made a pragmatic decision to look for an automaker from whom we would be
able to secure a rich data material.
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We specifically used a temporal bracketing strategy for analyzing the case data (Langley 1999). Such a strategy
enables the construction of comparative analysis units (in this paper we refer to these as episodes) for investigating
and replicating theoretical ideas. As Langley (1999) notes, it has proven especially useful in studies that incorporate
some form of mutual shaping or multidirectional causality into the theorization. The temporal bracketing strategy
intends to identify and predict “patterned regularities over time” (Markus and Robey 1988) by “… moving from a
shapeless data spaghetti toward some kind of theoretical understanding that does not betray the richness,
dynamism, and complexity of the data but that is understandable and potentially useful to others” (Langley 1999, p.
694). In this regard, we think of this theorizing effort as an initial formulation of a set of relationships and
assumptions that intends to make sense of a new emerging phenomenon (Walsham 1995; Weick 1995).

Data Collection
By collecting fine-grained qualitative data through participant observation, interviews, focus groups, and document
review, this study concurs with the typical intensive case study (Eisenhardt 1989; Gerring 2007; Klein and Myers
1999). During the data collection phase, ranging from October 2007 to May 2009, the first author of this paper spent
considerable time at CarCorp. On the spectrum outlined by Nandhakumar and Jones (1997), the data-gathering
method can be positioned somewhere in the middle between maximum distance and maximum engagement.
Throughout a six-month period, her participant observation involved having a desk at the research site, attending
meetings, and interacting with employees at CarCorp on nearly a daily basis. The first author’s presence at the
automaker enabled informal conversations with respondents during coffee breaks, lunches, and meetings. Such
conversation added depth to the data material and ensured a fine-grained understanding of CarCorp’s instrument
cluster design. A total of about eighty contacts were documented during this participant observation.
In addition, we conducted, recorded, and transcribed thirty-eight semi-structured interviews with twenty-three
employees. The interviews lasted sixty-four minutes, on average, with a standard deviation of twenty-four minutes.
As Table 1 depicts, respondents ranged from managers to designers, and they covered the three areas of expertise
briefly described in the research-setting subsection: HMI engineers, design engineers, and software engineers.
Table 1: Overview of Respondents
Category

Role

HMI engineers

HMI managers
Ergonomists
Interaction designers

4
4
5

Design engineers

Industrial design
Marketing
Product managers

2
1
1

SW engineers

SW managers
SW engineers

6
15

Total

Number of interviews

38

Third, a number of focus groups were organized to validate the empirical findings over time. These workshops
allowed us to refine our understanding of the case and complement facts. Consistent with the notion of engaged
scholarship (Van de Ven 2007), this was an opportunity for practitioners to reflect on their practice in view of our
findings and recommendations. Lastly, we also read relevant archival documents, typically including assessments of
system specifications and concept descriptions. Such assessments were important, e.g., for tracking the specific
details of the software platform investigated. Documents also improved our understanding of how tasks were
completed and processes performed compared to what was documented.

Data Analysis
As always in interpretive research, the data collection and data analysis were conducted in tandem to benefit from
the understanding emerging from recursively iterating between theoretical conceptions and the empirical material
(Klein and Myers 1999). For clarity purposes, however, it is useful to describe the data analysis as a four-step
process (see Table 2). The first author of the article conducted the open coding, while the remaining steps involved
all three authors.
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Table 2: Data Analysis Process
Steps
1. Open coding

2. Focused coding

3. Identify tensions in
dominant designs

4. Theorize the
underlying process

Tasks

Output

a. Merge data sources
b. Initial coding of the data material
c. Initial data cleansing
a. Using key themes of the tentative
model to examine, categorize,
and cluster the descriptive
concepts generated in step 1
b. Analyze stakeholders’ interaction
and relationships
a. Compare and reflect on the
coding of key stakeholders’
accounts
b. Create a timeline of key events
c. Identify tensions between
processes and product design
a. Synthesize steps 1–3

• More than 300 mutually
exclusive descriptive concepts
• Initial understanding of
digitization and dominant design
at GlobalCarCorp
• Overview of key stakeholders
• Overview of experiences and
interpretations of the software
platform initiative
• Three episodes comprising
tensions in the innovation
process (see Table 3)
• Validating the conceptual model
(See Figure 1)

First, through iterative reading of the data, the initial analysis involved open coding (Charmaz 2006; Strauss and
Corbin 1998). The open-coding process involved naming and taking segments of data apart, shaping the entire
empirical frame from which we built our analysis. This initial process generated almost 500 concepts. After
eliminating redundant concepts, we settled with more than 300 mutually exclusively descriptive concepts. Second,
the open-coding procedure was followed by focused coding, searching for emergent core categories in the material
(Charmaz 2006; Miles and Huberman 1994) with key themes of the model as a basis (Figure 1). This involved a
linking and consolidating process in which we examined the relationship between codes, and crystallized the
experiences and interpretations of the software platform initiative at GlobalCarCorp. In the third step of the data
analysis, we conducted a cross-stakeholder analysis to sensitize multiple interpretations (Klein and Myers 1999),
comparing and reflecting on the categories related to each stakeholder group (Langley 1999). Lastly, after
discussing the coding scheme within the research team, we compared the empirical findings against the literature
and the tentative conceptual model.

DIGITAL INNOVATION AT GLOBALCARCORP
In 2004, GlobalCarCorp initiated a strategy for standardizing instrument cluster design. Seeking commonality gains,
the company’s initial justification for the strategy involved the use of digital technology for deploying the same
tangible instrument cluster for different car brands and markets. Instead of relying entirely on hardware
differentiation, the idea was to use digital displays to generate cluster variants through appropriate choices of colors,
fonts, and graphical objects.
To enable such software-based differentiation, CarCorp, a subsidiary of GlobalCarCorp, was encouraged to pursue
a project for developing a software platform (hereafter called the SoftClusterPlatform) for instrument cluster design.
At the heart of the new platform was the HMI editor to develop cluster software. With the HMI editor, engineers
would be able to generate cluster variants by manipulating a prescribed parameter set for fonts, languages, colors,
layout, and graphical objects. For instance, country-specific preferences, such as language, could be manipulated
when specifying an instrument cluster for a new market. The editor output was XML-files that were interpreted by the
1
in-car platform when deployed. In this way, instrument cluster variants could be created across car models using
the same hardware. A software engineer explained the rationale behind the platform and its new way of organizing
design practices:
There was no common way to work with HMI within GlobalCarCorp. We developed a new concept for
each new car model, which often was governed by the hardware architecture. With a single way of
using the HMI software, we would start sharing components between the different brands. We want to
realize the functionality through software and not embed it in the cluster. In this way, we would focus
on updating software rather than hardware components.
1
In the car, a so-called HMI engine interpreted the XML-files, user input, and dynamic car sensor data (e.g., fuel consumption), for generating the
interface on the display.

Volume 13

Issue 2

Article 2

11

The use of the same HMI template for different car models broke significantly with the established process of
organizing instrument cluster design at the automaker. Prior to the SoftClusterPlatform, modification of instrument
clusters was performed step-by-step for each car model. Using standard package software such as Word,
PowerPoint, or Visio, HMI engineers specified requirements in the form of text and simple graphical illustrations.
These requirements were then forwarded to the supplier, which generated initial cluster prototypes that were tested
and verified by the HMI engineers at GlobalCarCorp. Based on this validation process, change requests were
specified and sent back to the supplier for modification of the cluster. As one HMI engineer suggested, this was a
quite ideographic process that resulted in unique solutions for specific car models:
In our former design process we first described what we wanted to accomplish … and then we went to the
supplier and interacted with them, discussing “how should we solve this” and “this situation is unique, we
have to make an adjustment.” We then updated the specification with the information that the supplier
needed.
This ideographic process demanded considerable interaction with the supplier, which was both time-consuming and
costly. The HMI engineer continued:
Even a minor change such as a spelling mistake or a change of color demanded several iterations [with
the supplier] and cost a lot of money.
Since the platform provided a template by which HMI engineers designed the instrument cluster, it implied a new
organization of the instrument-cluster design process. While the HMI engineer used to be the central node for the
initial collection of requirements from functional units (e.g., navigation and radio) and other internal stakeholders, the
platform caused her to subtly shift her position in the network. Users of the HMI editor, i.e., the newly hired software
engineers, became center-stage, while the traditional HMI engineers, focusing on ergonomics and user interaction
models, became one stakeholder among others.
The following account is intended to illustrate GlobalCarCorp’s efforts to draw on digital technology for renewing the
instrument cluster innovation process. As noted in the methodology section, we distinguished three episodes, each
describing tensions emerging from specific use of digital technology in view of the established dominant design.
Episode 1―Temporal Mismatches
While the use of the HMI editor broke significantly with the established process of organizing instrument cluster
design at the automaker, the simplicity by which a new variant could be generated through the platform helped
GlobalCarCorp delay the binding of specific HMI-related requirements. This allowed, in particular, for late responses
to changing market circumstances. It also permitted more fine-tuned differentiation between car brands. As one of
the software engineers explained:
The idea was to become more flexible and be able to implement and modify the HMI software very late in
the development process. Management did put a lot of weight on flexibility and on enabling new ways for
differentiation between brands.
Similarly, one HMI engineer stressed the possibility to generate new visualizations quickly:
The advantage of the platform is that we can test, visualize, and evaluate so many more possibilities. If I
have an idea, I can go to Peter or Mike and explain my idea and after a couple of minutes they show me
the solution and ask, “Is this what you were thinking of?” … It can be visualized directly with the editor.
While the platform allowed for agile responses to new requirements, established processes, however, still remained
in the minds of most people at GlobalCarCorp. With the new platform relying on software, a new version of the HMI
design was essentially much closer to actual implementation in cars than what used to be the case. The new
platform enabled HMI engineers to change the entire HMI design much more rapidly, without necessarily following
the formal requirements management process. An illustrative comment of a software engineer was:
I sometimes discuss change requests with people who treat them as if they still were such a big deal. And
then they ask me, “Peter, how long does it take to implement this?” And I often reply: “It is done before I
complete this sentence.” The platform allows me to implement change requests so fast but there are very
few people who know about it, unfortunately.…
Similarly, a HMI engineer noted that:
We are stuck in old processes and routines. It’s like “we have always worked in this way, so this is how
we will work tomorrow as well.”
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However, in order to make official changes in the cluster (software or not), one needed to follow the established
processes. In this regard, the SoftClusterPlatform challenged the institutionalized requirements of the management
process which involved people in marketing/product planning, interaction design, and functional units (e.g., radio,
antenna, or navigation). Specifically, the shorter implementation cycles contributed to a temporal mismatch between
the new product design and the practices established among those who provided the requirements. As a result, the
software engineers faced conflicting requirements and often relied on individual judgment to meet deadlines. As
stated by a software engineer:
We often need to run around to locate people with whom to discuss what to implement. Then, we
eventually get a pretty good picture of how the function, and its HMI, should look like, what kind of details
and where they belong and things like that … but there is no new process that is established in the
organization.
If the requirements would have been complete, we could have been mass-producing variants because,
again, the implementation goes awfully fast.… But the organization cannot handle this. It is like having a
jet motor assembled on a bicycle.
In sum, the new platform enabled more agile processes. Changes could be implemented directly using the tools of
the SoftClusterPlatform, without necessarily writing down the requirement in a document and following the official
procedures. As a result, a lot of pressure was put on the software engineers who implemented the requirements, as
the traditional providers of requirements in the organization continued operating as if there was time for the
traditional way of documenting requirements with iterations and negotiations. This, along with more people involved
in the requirement management process, resulting in conflicting requirements, was stressful for the software
engineers who were forced to follow certain deadlines. The new digital technology created a temporal tension
between the product design and the established cross-organizational processes.
Episode 2―Contradictions in Software Updates
Increasingly, like many other automakers, GlobalCarCorp experienced the need to establish a presence at new and
growing markets. In 2007, therefore, the automaker initiated a global strategy focusing on the Asian market. For the
instrument cluster group, the entrance to new markets involved the incorporation of new languages and symbols for
GlobalCarCorp brands. As observed by an HMI manager, the incorporation of a new language involved a number of
considerations:
We have to take care of all the different languages on the global market. It is not only about changing a
text string when changing language. You also have to consider the length of the new word and maybe
change to a different font or change size or height of the text string, and also the surrounding objects.
At this time, the automaker implemented, updated, and maintained twenty-three languages simply for the instrument
cluster. Although the SoftClusterPlatform supported flexible and fast language updates, deploying a new language in
actual clusters was limited by the current hardware product design. For example, the memory needed for increasing
the number of languages was limited by the hardware specification. Given GlobalCarCorp’s long tradition of saving
costs where possible and the lack of tradition of frequent updates of the product, the computing platform was as lean
as possible. This was a problem with existing in-car computing platforms when moving into the Asian market. Also, a
direct, but unintended, consequence of the updates dilemma was a conflict on established relationships and division
of roles between the HMI engineers and the suppliers. While the software updates were handled at CarCorp, they
still needed to be deployed by suppliers rather than at the final assembly. This complexity contributed to the fact that
implementing software updates, such as changing a font size, could take months to implement despite the new
platform.
In view of the automaker’s manufacturing legacy, virtually all processes assumed a hardware-based product. For
instance, the hardware was usually specified and decided on in the beginning of a car project, which had a
development cycle of approximately five years with a set of predefined update windows. Using the
SoftClusterPlatform for adding a new language took a few minutes, but the change for updates was stalled until the
next window. Any change also had to be coordinated with the supplier who handled the hardware parts. This would
sometimes take months and resulted in tensions between the narrow update windows fitted for hardware
manufacturing and the agile and frequent software updates. As a HMI manager acknowledged:
We are generating clusters with already incorporated software instead of implementing an empty cluster
and implement the software as the last step of the process. That is our biggest concern, and probably our
biggest challenge―to find ways to implement the software very late in the process. Changing as much as
a small text string takes way too long time.
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The incompatibility between the hardware with its established development process and the agility of software
limited the possibilities for GlobalCarCorp to successfully meet new market requirements. In fact, the time lag in
software updates made GlobalCarCorp produce cars with instrument clusters lacking updated software. Since the
platform allowed ongoing evaluation of software, errors (e.g., spelling mistakes or misplaced symbols) were
continuously found and immediately corrected. However, the updated software could be deployed only in
conjunction with hardware updates, which included a visit to the supplier. The HMI manager described the process
in the following way:
We make software changes in two minutes. We can send them wirelessly to the manufacturing plant in no
seconds at all. Instead, the software takes a detour to our supplier who includes it in the clusters. The
software basically goes around the world before it comes back to our cars.
Overall, the new platform enabled fast updates and correction of discovered errors. Yet the dominant design limited
the automaker’s possibilities to leverage the platform fully. As a result, GlobalCarCorp were left shipping poorly
updated instrument clusters. This inter-dependency between hardware and software updates was increasingly
frustrating for the software engineers. Specifically, it revealed a tension between late software updates, enabled by
the platform, and the established hardware design processes.
Episode 3―Side-effects of Legacy Systems
In 2008, GlobalCarCorp pursued new global strategies that counteracted the cluster subsystem platform intentions.
In response to the financial crises at the time, they decided to reduce the number of components that would be used
throughout by the global automaker. The objective was to achieve commonality gains through streamlining
purchasing activities and maintenance costs. While the decision makers had the same ambition when introducing
the SoftClusterPlatform, this decision also hit hard on software-based variation. This paradoxical effect could be
traced to the existing procedure for managing parts at the automaker, perhaps best illustrated by the parts number
system.
The established parts number system, documenting each subsystem as a hierarchy of parts, could not
accommodate software in other ways than making them part of a tangible component. Accordingly, from the
standpoint of the instrument cluster as a specific subsystem, the physical cluster component was parent for all other
components, including software. Changing anything on a lower hierarchical level required part number changes in all
components above. Since software was included at lower levels of the cluster component hierarchy, new part
numbers were required for all higher-level components as soon as a new platform-generated XML-file was
deployed. One software engineer described the situation:
Well, the thing is that the component, in this case the cluster, owns the part number because that is
what’s assembled in the car. And that means that, if you change any of its subcomponents, you have to
change the part number on the complete component.… That means that, if you have two identical
physical clusters, same hardware, the same look, but use a green bitmap in one of them and use the
same bitmap but blue in the other one, this minor difference unfortunately creates the need for two
different cluster part numbers. Every little variation requires a new part number.… You cannot change
anything; everything is intertwined with each other. That is the problem.
To cut the amount of costly part numbers, a decision was made to have as few varieties of software modules as
possible. Ironically, even though the platform enabled software differentiation for clusters, the outcome was the
opposite. The software group manager noted:
If you make the HMI different between cars, there will be an increasing amount of components that need
to be managed, and this results in high costs and a lot of administrative work. It gets too big. So the most
practical way to do this is to reduce the amount of variations of XML-files with the consequence that the
HMI will be similar in all cars.
I spend all this time explaining the benefits of using the tool for differentiation, but we cannot do it. We
would need some sort of portfolio to explain to people. Then maybe they would think, “Let’s take this
opportunity and don’t give a damn about the increase of part numbers.”
Specifically, by limiting part numbers to reduce the cost for part data management, the number of XML files was also
strictly limited―leading to less software-based differentiation. In fact, the reasons included for initially developing
and utilizing the SoftClusterPlatform were now, for the most part, downplayed. For example, another software
engineer commented:
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The lack of differentiation does not depend on the tool but the organization. We could have differentiated
the HMI between brand 1 and brand 2, but it was an administrative question. Differentiation generates
new part numbers, which drive costs, and we simply had to accept that.
This last tension, revealing the unanticipated consequences of the legacy systems, illustrates the inability of
GlobalCarCorp to follow through on their platform initiative to transform simultaneously the product design and the
prevailing cross-organizational processes. It exposed the difficulties of releasing the software initiative from the
dominant design revolving around hardware. In sum, the new parts number strategy meant that the instrument
cluster design group at CarCorp was more or less back where it started, experiencing difficulties in trying to leverage
new digital technology.

DISCUSSION
We set out to increase our understanding of the role of dominant design in the digital innovation of productdeveloping firms. With this focus in mind, we conducted intensive case study research (Gerring 2007) of instrument
cluster design at GlobalCarCorp. In what follows, we first discuss the three episodes that derived from our data
collection and analysis. On the basis of this discussion, we outline implications for the digital innovation literature
and the continued investigation of digital technology and dominant design.

Dominant Design and Digital Innovation at GlobalCarCorp
Many manufacturing firms have gained their capabilities and design practices through long periods of incremental
refinement of organizational processes and product designs. As seminal research on technology cycles shows
(Anderson and Tushman 1990), once the design competition around technological alternatives (e.g., combustion,
gas, or electric engines in cars) is settled in a particular market, a dominant design emerges and triggers firms to
concentrate on process innovation rather than on creating superior products based on radically new technology
(Murmann and Frenken 2006). In this regard, the digitization of tangible products presents nontrivial challenges to
established firms.
At the same time, established firms cannot afford to passively observe the evolution by which digital technology
eventually transforms their industry and value propositions. Digital technology promises to lead to increased product
performance and experience, and we can already see the traces of how automobiles, cameras, and other industrialage products are changing because of digital technology (King and Lyytinen 2004; Tripsas 2009; Yoo et al. 2010).
Consequently, most firms currently attempt to organize for innovation in the digital age.
Given the coexistence of these seemingly divergent forces―the dominant design and new digital technology―more
knowledge is needed, not only concerning the influence of digital technology on established linkages between the
organizational processes and the actual product design, but also concerning how such linkages condition the use of
digital technology (cf. Orlikowski 1992). Drawing on existing innovation research on this mutual relationship (Baldwin
and Clark 2000; Henderson and Clark 1990; Sosa et al. 2004) and on digital innovation (Yoo et al. 2010), when
investigating the digitization of the instrument cluster at CarCorp, we anticipated tensions in these linkages. Table 3
depicts the tensions applicable to the conceptual model (Figure 1) presented earlier derived from analyzing the data
collected at CarCorp.
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Table 3: Episodes of Product Design-Process Tensions at CarCorp
Digital Technology
Capabilities

Tensions

Outcome

Episode 1: Temporal Mismatches
• Late binding of
requirements to
increase agility

• The platform-in-use rendered fast
implementation cycles, which
created temporal mismatches with
established requirement
management practices.

• Faster implementation of
requirements
• Relevant requirements missed
in the implementation process
• Unstructured handling of
requirements

Episode 2: Contradictions in Software Updates
• Facilitating the
incorporation of new
languages and symbols

• The platform enabled timely
updates of languages and symbols,
which could not be realized due to
limitations in the existing hardware
design and manufacturing process.

• GlobalCarCorp shipped
instrument clusters without the
latest SW updates

Episode 3: Side Effects of Legacy Systems
• Reducing parts to
achieve commonality
gains

• The manufacturing legacy of the
part-data-management system
hampered the low-cost variety
achieved through the new platform.

• Reduced instrument cluster
variety that the platform
rendered possible

Our study at GlobalCarCorp suggests that increasing digital content of physical artifacts is a challenge that cuts
across the established product-developing organization. The automaker’s disintegration of the instrument cluster as
a hardware component, and the software used for driver information and visual expression, offered new flexibility.
The newly recruited software engineers could now potentially address change requests swiftly, traditionally handled
through close supplier interaction with long lead times and high costs. The redefined supplier relationship created
new roles (e.g., software engineer) and redefined roles (e.g., HMI engineer) at the automaker. However, it was also
clear the software platform initiative was highly influenced by the established dominant design.
The first episode revealed tensions that occur in digital innovation due to temporal mismatches between digital
capabilities and established organizational processes. For example, GlobalCarCorp wanted to exploit the possibility
of using digital technology to achieve late binding of requirements and more agility. Traditionally, early attribution of
functionality to physical components is important to achieve a product design that can be sourced to suppliers for
mass-scale production (Baldwin and Clark 2000). Given the long tradition of innovating with tangible components, it
was not surprising, therefore, that many of the important stakeholders in the requirements-management process
assumed previous practices established in the industry. Given their ambition to leverage the agility of the new
platform, the software engineers were put under significant pressure in their new coordinating role of HMI
requirements. In this regard, there was a significant temporal tension between the new product design and the
established cross-organizational processes.
The second episode epitomized how long-accepted principles for hardware design and manufacturing may restrict
the possibilities of new digital technology. In order to reduce cost and realize algorithmic production for mass-scale
advantages (cf. Chandler 1977), the dominant design of the automotive industry is geared toward optimizing
hardware resources for predefined functionality. Consistently, GlobalCarCorp allowed only short windows for making
software updates, as such updates were treated as any update of the car. In addition, the software had to be sent to
the hardware supplier for implementation. Despite the existence of new software updates generated through the use
of the platform, the tight couplings between the development process and the tangible design of the product
hindered timely software updates of instrument clusters and devalued the digital capabilities of the platform.
Lastly, the third episode underlined the extent to which legacy systems may severely hamper digital capabilities. We
observed how the financial crises at the time influenced GlobalCarCorp to reduce the number of tangible parts used
across the firm. Traditionally, high varieties of parts drive costs, and, therefore, manufacturing firms strive to
increase the reuse of the same parts across cars and car lines. Although this was an important basis for adopting
the SoftClusterPlatform in the first place, GlobalCarCorp’s decision, ironically, took the use of the platform back to an
early and premature stage. Our data traced this to the hardware legacy of the parts number system, where software
was subsumed to the lowest levels of the product design hierarchy. As a result, even a low-cost software-based
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variant would create the need for new part numbers on each higher level in the parts number system. Since this
clashed with GlobalCarCorp’s intention to reduce the amount of part numbers for their components globally, this
became a real setback for CarCorp’s attempts to use digital technology for low-cost software-based differentiation of
instrument clusters.

Implications
As suggested by Yoo et al. (2010), digital innovation is an excellent opportunity for advancing a new wave of IS
research that cuts across some of the core topics of the traditional management and innovation literature. To this
end, this paper contributes a new model that conceptualizes the role of dominant design in the digital innovation
practices of product-developing firms. In this regard, the paper extends previous literature on established firms (e.g.,
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995; Hargadon and Douglas 2001) by focusing on technological discontinuities (Anderson
and Tushman 1990) in the form of digital technology. Although the relation between organizational processes and
product design within a dominant design is well-documented (Anderson and Tushman 1990; Baldwin and Clark
2000), little attention has been paid to disruptions of such structures traceable to digital technology. The few
exceptions that deal with digital technology focus on, e.g., corporate identity (Tripsas 2009) or securities analysts
(Benner 2010).
Our research also provides insight into digital innovation as an emerging theme for IS research. As Yoo et al. (2010)
argue, IS research has been concentrated on process innovation (e.g., Fichman 2004; Swanson 1994). When digital
technology is integrated into many of the tangible artifacts that surround us in everyday life, this is an opportunity to
broaden IS innovation research into the socio-technical research challenges related to product innovation. Clearly,
digital technology has the potential to transform some of the most established industries, and it is imperative,
therefore, to identify new ways to understand this transformation. Our paper represents an early step in this quest for
new knowledge by zooming in on the relation between product design and organization design.
As for practical implications, it can be noted that the reciprocity of digital innovation suggests that the promises of
digital technology cannot be absorbed and cultivated in the established firm without tensions and sensemaking. After
all, for established firms such as GlobalCarCorp, where the dominant design has shaped organizational processes
over many years, new digital technology cannot be designed forcefully but has to be nurtured in a trial-and-error
fashion. In this process, product-developing firms embracing digital technology need to learn how to handle the
inherent tensions between digital technology and physical components with its associated innovation structures. For
instance, there is an inherent temporal tension between cross-organizational processes designed for exploiting scale
advantages in manufacturing and tasks designed for leveraging the programmability and reproducibility of software.
Looking at Fine’s (1998) analysis of temporality differences between industries, this inherent tension can be traced
to the need of manufacturing firms to compensate massive investments in, for instance, new car lines with product
lifecycles of four years or longer. At the other end of the continuum, the software industry is characterized by a
considerably faster rhythm, where the lack of physical constraints makes new product releases commonplace and
frequent. In digital innovation, digital and physical components meet in the same product, creating dissonances that
need to be appreciated to advance the capabilities of the products designed and the series of tasks intended to
achieve that advancement.

CONCLUSION
Digital innovation is an activity that involves the creation of new combinations of digital and physical components to
produce novel products (Yoo et al. 2010). Such innovation is becoming more and more important for established
firms wishing to enhance the functionality and capabilities of tangible products, such as cameras (Tripsas 2009),
cars (King and Lyytinen 2004), and ship cranes (Jonsson et al. 2008). Features of digital technology such as
programmability and reproducibility stimulate firms to create new ways of innovating their products. In this regard,
digital innovation shapes established processes and product designs. However, the processes aligning the tasks
required to realize an innovation and its product design also influence digital innovation via its manifestation of the
industry’s dominant design. This is why the management of digital technology in product-developing firms of
established industries requires attention to the tensions that emerge in the wake of such reciprocity.
Future studies could address several limitations in our work. First, our research elaborates a new model. To
consolidate the findings of this study, future research could engage in theory-testing activity in which specific
relationships between key concepts in the model are given closer attention in order to improve the reliability of the
model. This could be done through employing more sophisticated process-tracing techniques (George and Bennett
2005; Gerring 2007) or through variance research (Markus and Robey 1988). Second, our research builds on a
single case study in the automotive industry. While analytic generalization (Yin 2009) is possible from such research,
the digitization of physical products is ongoing in other industries. Our understanding of the transformative impact of
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digital innovation would benefit considerably from studies carried out in product-developing settings other than
manufacturing.
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